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Copy: D/FE  
AD/ORE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project: IP-81

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

*No S&S req.*

25X1A

Date: 13 Mar 50

To: D/FE

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: Chinese aid to Viet Minh

Statement of Project:

Origin: Internal (D-01)

Problem: To estimate aid being furnished Viet Minh by the Chinese communists

Scope:

This project has been discussed by requester with  
[redacted] of D/FE

25X1A

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum (orig + 2)

Draft due in D/Pub: earliest convenience

Responsible Division: D/FE

Dissemination deadline  
(if any)

Internal Coordination: EE/8

Departmental Responsibilities: None


Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

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
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub

13 March 1950

25X1A ATTENTION :   
SUBJECT : Request for Estimate

1. It is requested that this office be furnished an estimate of the aid being furnished the Viet Minh by the Chinese Communists.
2. We would like this information as soon as possible.

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Case No. D-01

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File copy  
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**SECRET**

Note: The classification of this memorandum must be raised to conform to the classification of the draft it covers.

Date 23 March 1950

## MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

**SUBJECT:** Transmission of Draft Report

**ENCLOSURE:** IP-81 "Chinese Communist Aid to Vietnamese Resistance"

(3 copies)

1. Enclosure is forwarded herewith for ~~/X//S//A//C//O//N//F//I//D//E//N//T//I//A//L//~~  
~~E//P//I//D//I//O//M//I//O//G//Y//~~ ~~/U//S//D//H//Q//~~ ~~/J//R//E//D//U//C//T//I//O//N//~~  
transmittal to requester.

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2. This draft report has been coordinated informally with the organizations checked below:

Within CIA:

D/GI		D/NO	
D/In		D/LA	
D/Tr		D/WE	
D/EE	X	D/Na	
D/FE		D/EC	
D/NE		Other	

Outside CIA:

State	(OIR)	
Army	(ID/GSUSA)	
Navy	(ONI)	
Air	(AID)	
Other		

3. Maps and/or Graphics to be included in this report and arrangements completed for their production by the Map Division or the Presentation Staff are as follows:

NONE

Comments: Because of probable general interest in the subject of IP-81, a recommendation has been made informally to the Current Branch of Publications Division that the material be presented as a special article in the current ORE WEEKLY.

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D/FE

# INTRODUCTION

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**SECRET**21 March 1950  
IP-61CHINESE COMMUNIST AID TO VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE

The balance of information on the extent of Chinese Communist aid to the Vietnamese Resistance indicates that there is almost certainly some movement of military supplies from China to the Resistance, and that Resistance personnel have been moving back and forth across the Indochina border without interference. The information does not, however, establish the existence at present of a large-scale program of Chinese Communist military aid nor is there reliable evidence of Chinese Communist participation in the war against the French.

In late February, French officers in the border town of Langson told a New York Times correspondent that the Resistance was receiving arms from the Chinese Communists, but that the extent of such aid was not clear. These sources took the view that the Resistance was probably getting no more from the Chinese than they could pay for. They also stated that, on three separate occasions, Resistance units had assembled in Chinese territory for attacks on French-held border outposts.

In early March, more specific information was received [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said that one battalion of artillery equipped with three 75mm guns and 60 and 80 mm mortars took part in a Resistance attack (19 Feb.) on the border post of Pholu. Further, he said that Chinese Communists aided the Resistance by firing across the border at a French garrison (Ba-Xat) during a Resistance assault. He also alleged that Resistance troops are crossing the Tonkin-Chinese border, are being armed by Chinese Communists, and then returning by way of the pass at Ban Iao.

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[REDACTED] pointed out that the

Resistance artillery fire during the Phou action was unprecedentedly heavy and constituted definite evidence of Chinese Communist aid.

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Several reports

report

actual and potential Chinese Communist aid to the Resistance on a large scale.

[REDACTED] stated that 10,000 Chinese troops are on the border and ready to infiltrate Vietnam and join Resistance forces individually.

[REDACTED] the Chinese Communist 45th army has crossed the border into Indochina, that Chinese Communist advisors are with the Resistance, and that "verified" large quantities of machine guns, rifles, ammunition and artillery have been provided the Resistance by the Chinese Communists.

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[REDACTED] report is considered extremely doubtful, not only because the source is notoriously unreliable, but also because the French are in a position to observe such developments and would have little reason to conceal the knowledge. Partial truth in the [REDACTED] report is,

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however, probably contained in the reference to the sale and/or delivery of some arms and ammunition to the Resistance and the presence of some Chinese Communists with the Resistance. The infiltration of 10,000 Chinese Communists is doubtful in view of the fact that such a large number of Chinese, even if scattered, would be conspicuous in Tonkin and would represent a contradiction to Ho's emphasis on nationalism. Moreover, the Resistance is short of munitions, and probably of skilled military technicians, rather than of manpower.

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While some suspicion attaches to [REDACTED] reports, [REDACTED]

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it is

nevertheless believed that these reports reflect a generally true picture of limited aid to the Resistance. It must be noted, however, that arms traffic across the border from South China, and arms smuggling from the Philippines, Thailand and other places to Resistance areas has been continuing for several years. With the Chinese Communists in control of South China and publicly committed to the support ("moral and material, where possible") of the various "liberation" movements of Southeast Asia, the present tendency is to attribute all Resistance acquisitions of military aid to Chinese Communist aid. It is, in fact, extremely difficult at present to determine exactly from what sources Resistance munitions are being received and what percentage of them even if received from Chinese Communists on the border are from the "Peoples Republic of China" as part of an active program of military and political support.

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It is quite likely that most of the arms obtained by the Resistance are captured, locally manufactured, or purchased from a variety of sources, including the Chinese Communists. The fact that there has been no visible increase in the military capabilities of the Resistance indicates either (1) that the Resistance has achieved no really significant increase in its armaments, or (2) that, assuming military aid is being received, it is being held in reserve for future large-scale operations.

The apparent increase in Chinese Communist-Resistance contacts, when viewed against the ideological background of the Chinese Communist-Resistance relationship, establishes the practical certainty of some aid, at present, and the strong probability of increased physical aid over the next three months to a year. This prediction is, however, based upon two assumptions: (1) that the Chinese Communists will succeed in consolidating their South China position and will not be exclusively preoccupied with the pacification of an unruly peasantry or the invasions of Hainan, Taiwan and Tibet, and (2) that the Resistance under Ho Chi Minh will not openly break with the Stalinist bloc.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Project: IP-82

Date: 13 Mar 50

To: ~~D/EE~~ D/EE

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: Irregular minerals shipments to ~~Soviet Union~~ Poland

Statement of Project:

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Origin: Internal (Case )

Problem: To provide detailed information on alleged illegal shipments of certain minerals to Poland.

Scope:

Note: The material in response to this request ~~has been~~ was compiled by D/Pub ~~after~~ <sup>after</sup> consultation with appropriate divisions.

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum (orig + 2)

Draft due in D/Pub: 13 Mar 50

Responsible Division: various

Dissemination deadline  
(if any)

15 Mar 50

Internal Coordination: as needed

Departmental Responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

*D/FE*

2 March, 1950

Memo on D/Pub's request to D/FE for info in tin and tungsten shipments to Poland via Antwerp.

D/FE has no/ information indicating that tin or tungsten has been indirectly shipped to Soviet Satellites in recent years.

We find, however, that in 1949 our records for 10 months show that 50 tons of wolframite (65%  $WO_3$ ) were shipped to Holland. The bulk of wolframite exports went to the US, about 20% to the UK and the remainder, about 25%, to Belgium, France, Holland, Sweden and the USSR. The source for above is SO-34068, 26 Jan 50. Traders in Hongkong have frequently expressed the ~~opinion~~ suspicion that some tungsten and tin to Western Europe has been transshipped to the USSR (particularly through Sweden). No mention of Satellite demand has been made.

(see )

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*Bob -*

*This is all we have - which  
admittedly is not much.*



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23 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub ORE

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
ATTENTION : 

SUBJECT : Request for Information

1. This office has a requirement for all available information on irregular shipments of tin and tungsten from Hong-Kong through Antwerp to Poland.


2. Shippers, points of origin, forwarding agents, points of destination and ultimate consignees are of particular interest re this request.

3. Your assistance in this matter will be greatly appreciated.



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Reference: Case 

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
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7 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE

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ATTENTION :




SUBJECT : Request for Information

1. ORE's Eastern European Weekly of 29 November refers to ferromolybdenum and tungsten shipped from Belgium to Poland. Can you ascertain the shipper, point of origin and consignee?

2. It is requested this information be furnished by 15 March or as soon thereafter as practicable.

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Reference:



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15 March 1950

MEMORANDUM

Reference: Case [REDACTED]

1. This office is unable to submit information bearing directly upon the question asked in Case [REDACTED] but believes that the information in para. 2 and 3, below may be of some value in this connection. The information requested for Case [REDACTED] appears in para. 4, below.

2. Traders in Hongkong have frequently expressed the suspicion that some of the tungsten and tin shipped to Western Europe has been transhipped to the USSR. Sweden has been mentioned as a trans-shipment point. We know of no mention of Satellite transactions in tin and tungsten.

3. During the first ten months of 1949, 50 tons of 65% wolframite were shipped from China to the Netherlands. Of this amount about 55% went to the US, about 20% went to the UK, and the remainder, about 25% went to Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the USSR.

4. In November 1949 two shipments (one of 41,000 kilo of wolfram and the other of 73,000 kilo of ferro-molybdenum) were reported to have moved from Antwerp to consignees in Poland.

(a) The wolfram had been shipped from Hongkong to Antwerp by Metallurg, Inc., of New York. It was handled and warehoused in Antwerp by J. Niebording & Fils. Packaged in 800 bags, it was shipped from Antwerp on 5 November aboard the Polish vessel "SS Puck," by Polish Shipping Agency, Ltd., and was consigned to centralized trading agencies in Poland.

(b) The molybdenum, purchased by Falkiner (Faltiner?) of Zurich and shipped by them from Hongkong to Antwerp, was also warehoused in Antwerp and sold by Falkiner to Polish Shipping Agency, Ltd. It left Antwerp on 4 November aboard the Polish vessel "SS Wanda," consigned to centralized trading agencies in Poland.

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Project: 1P-83

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

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Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 16 March 50

To: D/FE

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: Internal conflict in CCP

Statement of Project:

Origin: Internal (D-02)

Problem: To evaluate State telegram OP-69, 13 March

Scope:

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum (orig. + 2)

Draft due in D/Pub: 1600 on 16 Mar 50

Responsible Division: D/FE

Dissemination deadline  
(if any)

1700 on 16 Mar 50

Internal Coordination: —

Departmental Responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only



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Memorandum For: D/Pub

March 16, 1950

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Attention: [REDACTED]

Subject : Request for Evaluation

Reference : State Telegram [REDACTED] March 13

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1. It is requested that this office be furnished an evaluation of reference telegram.

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2. [REDACTED] has already discussed the matter with [REDACTED] of the China Branch to inform him of our particular interests with regard to this telegram.

3. The evaluation would be greatly appreciated if received by 1700 hours today.

[REDACTED]

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Reference: D-02

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT


TO : Chief, D/Pub

DATE: 16 March 1950

FROM : Chief, D/FE

SUBJECT: Transmittal of IP-83

1. The attachment here to (in triplicate) is submitted in compliance with verbal instruction for production of IP-83.



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